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We note the absence of prior literature on analytical structures to be used for China and other economies
with extensive SOEs when evaluating behavioural responses of SOEs to trade policy and other changes.
This is despite both the large empirical literature discussing the productivity effects of Chinese SOE
enterprise reform, and wider policy discussion of the potential impacts of various reform initiatives.
We present two simple analytical formulations of SOE behaviour in response to trade policy change
with the aim of investigating how traditional competitive models of enterprise behaviour can mislead
when used in policy debate. One formulation centres on SOE managerial control. In this enterprise
managers are politically appointed, expect any non performing loans to be recapitalized by state banks
andhence capital is centrally allocated by credit rationing. The managers are assured to maximize the
size of the enterprise rather than profits since this yields maximal networking benefits to managers.
This implies labour is priced at its average rather than its marginal product, and with a competitive
non-manufacturing (agricultural) industry free trade is not optimal policy. The other assumes worker
control of SOEs and that workers satisfice in their supply of effort to the enterprise given both fixed
wage rates and enterprise employment and otherwise shirk or pursue second jobs. In this formulation
the enterprise meets their budget constraint and covers costs. With leisure in the preferences of enterprise
members, their leisure consumption will be implied by the satisfying behaviour of the enterprise and
will be non optimal. In both model variants, implications for trade policy are different from those of
a standard competitive model, and computations using models calibrated to 2003 Chinese data suggest
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It seems widely agreed in the literature both that the institutional structure of China’s economy
remains signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of the OECD economies, and that to analyze policy issues
in China using simple western style neoclassical models based on household utility and ﬁrm proﬁt
maximizing behaviour can be potentially misleading. Nowhere is this more the case than in the trade
policy area where simple competitive structures are now widely used to analyze a range of Chinese trade
policy issues including the implications of WTO accession and China’s regional trade agreements (see
Ianchovichina and Martin (2004)). This is despite China’s industrial sector continuing to heavily feature
state or communally owned enterprises (national, provincial, municipal government, publicly funded
research institutes, and other). Previous literature on Chinese SOEs has been mainly econometric;
assessing performance, proﬁtability and labour hiring (examples are Bigsten, Liu, and Zhang (2002),
Cull and Xu (2003), and Liu (2002)). None to our knowledge has been analytic.
Here we present two diﬀerent analytical structures which we use to analyze the behavioural response
of communally owned enterprises in China to trade policy changes using numerical simulation methods.
The ways that we model behavioural responses imply departures from Pareto optimality relative to
competitive structures, and so free trade is not best policy if no changes are made to enterprise structure.
Since our analysis also applies to other economies with SOEs, we also emphasize the analytical gap in
existing literature so far as model based analyses of the behavioural response of SOEs to such policy
changes, as trade liberalization is concerned. In the ﬁrst of these, we assume that enterprises are
managed by political appointees and that the state banking system will receive funds from the central
bank to cover any non-performing loans through a recapitalization. Capital is thus centrally allocated
via credit rationing, and with (eﬀectively) no servicing costs of debt the cost of capital to management
is zero. Enterprises are assumed to be entirely under managerial control, and we assume management
hires labour in a competitive labour market paying the going wage. If politically appointed enterprise
managers are motivated by the returns they receive from networking both with other managers and more
broadly within the political structure, they will seek to maximize the size of the enterprise subject to the
constraint of covering labour costs rather than proﬁts, since larger size confers more personal network
beneﬁts on management. This, in turn, means that enterprises hire labour up to the point that the
wage they pay equals the average rather than the marginal value product of labour. Typically, too much
labour will be hired (relative to a Pareto optimal outcome) in free trade and a tariﬀ will worsen things.
While a simpliﬁed analytical treatment, the key for our purposes is that in such an economy with state
owned enterprises in the industrial sector and competitive enterprises elsewhere (in agriculture), labour
is misallocated by freely functioning product and labour markets, and free trade need not to be the best
policy.
We ﬁrst show this for a case where the manufacturing sector has a single SOE and the economy is
a price taker (removing monopoly power for the SOE), and then extend this to a more complex case
where SOEs and competitive ﬁrms co-exist within the same sector. We use data for China for 2003 to
2calibrate both models. We are also able to make calculations of the cost to China of free trade in such
a world and assess the welfare implications of Chinese trade policy changes in the SOE models relative
to a comparable competitive model.
We then present a second formulation of SOE behaviour in which we assume that the workforce,
rather than management, collectively determines output. If the enterprise budget construct is not met
the enterprise will close and workers will lose their jobs. We assume that both employment and wage
guarantees apply for workers, who engage in satisﬁcing behaviour in terms of their supply of eﬀort in
meeting the enterprise budget constraint. Once enough eﬀort is expended to generate output to meet
this constraint, labour shirks or engages in moonlighting (second jobs). Capital is again assumed to be
centrally allocated at no cost to the enterprise. Here the analytical point is that from the enterprise
budget constraint, the eﬀort level of workers is determined. This implies that if preferences for workers
are deﬁned over both goods and leisure, the marginal utility of leisure will not equal the marginal
productivity of additional eﬀort in SOE production. Again, a departure from Pareto optimality occurs
relative to a traditional competitive structure. We also apply this formulation to 2003 Chinese data
showing that free trade is again not best policy, and also extend the model to the case where both
private ﬁrms and an SOE produce manufactuing output.
Both of these formulations are only crude abstractions from the more complex and diverse world of
communally owned production units which characterize the contemporary Chinese economy. Attempts
to combine these two formulations face the diﬃculty that only one objective function for the enterprise
can easily be accommodated. Also, state-owned enterprise reform in China has proceeded in recent
years in ways that imply that neither of these two simple formulations is entirely satisfactory. But given
the seeming absence of prior analytical literature on the behavioural response of SOEs to trade policy
change, and the implication we stress that in both model variants free trade is no longer best policy, we
believe that our analyses are of wider interest given that numerical results from competitive models are
now extensively cited in trade policy debute in China.
Many other potential formalizations of SOEs can probably be constructed, and we do not claim that
ours are in any way deﬁnitive. However, the ones we present are simple and transparent and lead to
diﬀerent policy implications from the traditional competitive case. These formulations thus provide an
initial base for further work, rather than deﬁnitive analyses of how Chinese SOEs actually respond to
policy change in practice. Numerical simulation work on economies such as China needs to take into
account more speciﬁcity of economic structure than currently appears in the literature, since simple
application of conventional neoclassical models to Chinese policy reform (such as trade liberalization)
can mislead.
32 The State-Owned Enterprise Sector in China
The state-owned enterprise sector in China, while declining somewhat in signiﬁcance in recent years,
is large, pervasive and embodies complex and interlocking forms of ownership and corporate control. Bill
Gates at a recent World Economic Forum Conference in Davos (Gates 2005) suggested that China has
created a new form of capitalism with heightened dynamism, meritocratic management, and superior
labour force organization. However, we tend to view China as perhaps closer to a new form of socialism or
communism rather than a new form of capitalism. In this new form, central direction through planning
has been removed but production units in the urban manufacturing sector remain largely communal
with many diverse organizational forms in their ownership and management structure. 1 Competition
between communally owned units both can be and typically is aggressive, but many of these entities
make losses, and the banking system has been used until recently as the mechanism for recapitalizing
loss making SOEs and servicing large non-performing loans. 2 Most of these enterprises also involve
politically appointed management who, in turn, seem to operate so as to maximize enterprise size for
personal network (Guanxi) beneﬁts rather than for proﬁts. Also, individual economic behaviour in
China is much more heavily reﬂective of group (family, village, town, county, district, province, country)
interest over individual interest than is true of OECD economies.
However measured, collectively owned and controlled enterprises in China’s industrial sector is sub-
stantial, even through the precise mix of public and private ownership is hard to ascertain because of the
complexity of organizational form. An example of this complexity is provided by Lenovo, who recently
received substantial media attention for their buy out of IBM’s PC Business. Lenovo is a quoted com-
pany listed on the Hong Kong and New York exchanges which has grown quickly since its establishment
in 1984. However, 43 % of Lenovo’s stock (a controlling interest) is held by Legend Holdings who in turn
are under the control of the Chinese Academy of Natural Sciences through a 65 % holding. Thus, Lenovo
is eﬀectively a communally controlled entity even through seemingly widely discussed in the media as a
private company.
Fan and Wang (2004) and Tan, Wang and Zhang (2005) (both quoted by Liu (2005)) estimate that
that of 1134 listed companies in China in 2001, 61.4 % are under local government control, 12.6 % are
under central government control, 3.4 % are collectivelly controlled, and 12.8 % are privately controlled,
with 5.2 % unaccounted for. The privately controlled component is up from 3 % in 1993, but still
represents a signiﬁcant minority of publically listed companies. Data on ownership forms for both listed
and non-listed enterprises are reported in a variety of forms in the China Statistical Yearbooks, and are
also quoted by Broadman (2001). In his data, in 1999 SOEs and collective enterprises accounted for 63
% of gross value added of all enterprises and SOEs and collective enterprises accounted for 70 % of 1999
industrial sector employment.
This communally owned and managed structure while complex in its detail is clearly central to
1See Broadman (2001).
2See Bonin and Huang (2002) who suggest that perhaps 60 % of loans to the banking sector are nonperforming, in
contract to oﬃcial estimates in the 25 % range.
4any evaluation of trade policy changes in China since the behavioural response of production units of
this form will diﬀer from that of competitive private ﬁrms as typically modelled in current numerical
analyses of Chinese trade policy changes. Previous numerical modelling literature on China either adopts
simple competitive assumptions as in Ianchovichina and Martin (2004), or variants of monopolistically
competitive models. Modelling capturing explicit representations of SOEs behaviour is absent. As we
note above, analytical literature on SOE behaviour seems not to be available and this is the gap we
attempt to partially ﬁll.
53 Models Capturing the Behavioural Response by Chinese SOEs
to Trade Policy Change
Any analytical structure used to represent the behavioural response of SOEs in China to policy or
other shocks (such as prices changes) will inevitably only provide an abstraction from a more complex
reality. The point emphasized here is that the behavioural response of such enterprises to policy change
is likely to depart from that of the competitive privately owned ﬁrm which provides the center piece of
Western neo-classical economic analysis, and analytical frameworks for the analysis of SOE behaviour
are not well developed in literature.
Here we consider two alternative formulations of SOE behavioural response to trade policy change.
In the ﬁrst, SOEs are assumed to be under managerial control with managers politically appointed.
We assume that capital is eﬀectively centrally allocated by rationed credit via the banking system,
and that all losses from non-performing loans made to state-owned enterprises are covered through a
recapitalization mechanism via the state owned banking system. As such, capital is eﬀectively free
to management but access to it is constrained via credit rationing. We then assume that enterprise
managers seek to maximize personal gain from networking and political connections (Guanxi). A simple
representation of this is to assume that enterprise managers seek to maximize enterprise size rather than
proﬁts. The implication is that if managers hire labour in a competitive labour market (a strong and
simplifying assumption in the Chinese case) and pay labour its going wage, they will hire labour up to
the point that the product price equals the average value product of labour, rather than the marginal
value product as in the competitive case.
In such a world, free trade will typically not be best policy since there is a departure from the
conditions for Pareto eﬃciency. Average product pricing of labour by SOEs will typically imply that
the SOE sector is too large relative to Pareto eﬃciency, and protection of this sector via trade barriers
can be Pareto improving. With a more complex formulation capturing co-existence of SOEs and private
ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector, if private ﬁrms provide marginal production conditions for Pareto
eﬃciency will be satisﬁed at the margin but inframarginal production will be ineﬃciently provided by
SOEs that are individually too large.
Our second formulation, in contrast, assumes that the work force rather than management collectively
controls the enterprise. Workers in SOEs are assumed to have job and wage guarantees (the so called Iron
Rice Bowl system), and collectively determine output in response to product prices set on world markets
(plus or minus ad valorem trade interventions). Capital is again assumed centrally allocated by credit
rationing, and to be at zero cost to the enterprise with losses again covered via recapitalization through
the banking system. In this case, workers collectively engage in satisﬁcing behaviour, supplying eﬀort to
produce enough output to meet their enterprise budget constraint, but otherwise engage in shirking or
moonlighting (taking second jobs). Here, with the ﬁrm budget constraint eﬀectively determining output
a fall in a product price (such as with the removal of protection) will increase output rather than reduce
it as in the competitive case. Moreover, eﬀort levels of workers are determined from the enterprise
6production function and the enterprise budget constraint due to the satisfycing bahaviour of workers.
This implies that if leisure enters preferences for these workers the marginal valuation of leisure (reduced
eﬀort) will not equal the marginal value of extra eﬀort in production in SOEs. Again, a departure from
Pareto optimality not present in a competitive model will occur and free trade again will not provide
best policy.
Our purpose in using these two simple formulations is to highlight both the diﬀerences in behaviour
relative to the conventional competitive ﬁrm case and the relative lack of analytical literature in this
area on which to draw in assessing behavioural response in China to trade policy change given the
large presence of SOEs. Also, the implication is that in the absence of enterprise reform, free trade will
typically not provide the appropriate trade policy stance.
3.1 Managerial Control Models
We consider two version of models incorporating SOE managerial enterprise control: a simple model
in which we assume there is only a single state-owned enterprise in the manufacturing sector and a more
complex variant in which both SOEs and competitive ﬁrms co-exist in the manufacturing sector. In both
cases, we assume there are two sectors in the economy, an agricultural sector with private competitive
enterprises and a manufacturing sector with either only a single SOE or a single SOEs along with a
series of atomistic competitive ﬁrms.
We consider a small open economy case with two goods (agriculture and manufacturing) both con-
sumption and produced. The world prices for the 2 goods (agriculture and manufacturing) are P0
A and
P0
M. Domestic prices are then given by world prices plus (or minus) the eﬀect of ad valorem border
measures (either import tariﬀs or export subsidies), i.e.
PA = (1 + rA)P0
A and PM = (1 + rM)P0
M (1)
where PA and PM are domestic prices of the agricultural and manufacturing products, and rA and rM
are agricultural and manufacturing import tariﬀs or export subsidies (rA > 0 and rM > 0 indicate tariﬀs,
and rA < 0 and rM < 0 indicate export subsidies).




where YA is agricultural output, LA is labour used in agriculture, φA is a units term (scalar parameter),
and αA < 1 is the production exponent. We assume that in this sector labour is paid its marginal







and agricultural rent is RA = PAYA − WALA.




7where YM is manufacturing output, LM is labour used in manufacturing, φM is a units term (scalar
parameter), and αM < 1 is the production exponent.
The use of capital by the enterprise is captured simply in the ﬁxed factor implied in the decreasing
returns production function. Capital is assumed to be allocating via centralized credit allocation through
the banking system, but recipients of loans (and hence capital) expect that any servicing costs of the loan
will be covered by central recapitalization of the banking system, and they can allow the loans to remain
as non-performing. We assume managers of the enterprise are politically appointed and are concerned
with the size of their personal network rather than proﬁts. Thus networking beneﬁts are assumed to be
collinear the size of the enterprise they manage. Thus, in this simple model with a single SOE, labour is
paid its average value product since managers maximize enterprise size measured by output Y subject
to the enterprise budget constraint.
Since capital is eﬀectively unpriced, this implies that
PMYM = WMLM + RM (5)
where RM is the (given) surplus to be transfered to the state by the SOE. This, in turn, implies that
labour receives its average value product plus its share of required surplus rather than its marginal
product. This implies that conditions for Pareto eﬃciency are violated, and as a result in such a model
free trade will typically not be best policy.
On the demand side of the model, domestic consumption of agricultural and manufacturing output
reﬂect utility maximizing behaviour by a single representative household, which for convenience we





M , θA + θM = 1 (6)
where XA and XM are consumption of agricultural and manufacturing, and θA and θM are Cobb-Douglas
exponents.
Household income is given by







where ZA = XA − YA and ZM = XM − YM are the net trade in each product (positive indicating
imports and negative indicating exports) and we assume any surplus accruing to the state is recycled to
consumers as lumpsum transfers.
The household budget constraint implies that
I = PAXA + PMXM (8)
From the household budget constraint there will be balanced trade in equilibrium. If preferences are








8Equilibrium conditions for this structure are that then there is full employment of labour
LA + LM = L (10)
and wage rates are equalized across the two sectors
WA = WM. (11)
In a more complex version of this model we assume that there both SOEs and private ﬁrms operate
in the manufacturing sector. Labour is assumed mobile between agriculture and manufacturing and
private ﬁrms will provide the marginal source of supply of output, but SOEs will hire labour up to the
point that the wage paid equals the enterprise average value product. We thus assume both an SOE and
competitive ﬁrms now operate in the manufacturing sector, and designate domestic prices for each to
allow for trade interventions to be ﬁrm speciﬁc. We again consider two sectors, agriculture with private
competitive enterprises and manufacturing, now with both SOEs and private groups. For simplicity we
consider only one SOE.
We again set the world prices as P0
A, P0
S and P0
P. Domestic prices are again assumed to be given
by world prices plus (or minus) the eﬀect of ad vlorem border measures (either import tariﬀs or export
subsidies), i.e.
PA = (1 + rA)P0
A and PS = (1 + rS)P0
S and PP = (1 + rP)P0
P (12)
where PA, PS and PP are domestic prices of the agricultural and manufacturing SOEs and private groups
product, rA, rS and rP are agricultural and manufacturing import tariﬀs and export subsidies (rA > 0,
rS > 0 and rP > 0 indicate import tariﬀs, and rA < 0, rS < 0 and rP < 0 indicate export subsidies).
In the agriculture sector the production function, wage rates, and agricultural rents are the same as
in the simple model, see (2) and (3).
In the manufacturing sector the production function for both SOEs and the private ﬁrms is
Ym = φmLαm
m for m = S,P (13)
where Ym is manufacturing output, Lm is labour used in manufacturing, φm is a units term (scalar
parameter), and αm < 1 is the production exponent. Capital is thus treated as a ﬁxed factor in the
private ﬁrms.
In the SOE, labour is paid its average value product plus its share of any required surplus and capital
is unpriced, and so
PSYS = WSLS + RS (14)
where RS is the (given) surplus paid to the government by the SOEs.
For the private ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector we assume that labour is paid its marginal product,







9and rent is RP = PPYP − WPLP.
Domestic consumption of agricultural and manufacturing output again reﬂects utility maximizing







P , θA + θS + θP = 1 (16)
where XA and Xm are consumption of agricultural and manufacturing products, and θA and θm are
Cobb-Douglas exponents for m = S,P.
Income is now given by










where ZA = XA −YA, ZS = XS −YS and ZP = XP −YP are net trades (positive indicates imports and
negative indicates exports) in each product.
The household budget constraint is
I = PAXA + PSXS + PPXP (18)











The equilibrium conditions are again that there is full employment of labour
LA + LS + LP = L (20)
and wage rates are equalized across the two sectors
WA = WS = WP. (21)
Since labour in the SOE group of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector receives its average value product
plus its share of any transferred surplus, rather than its marginal product, an equilibrium will again not
satisfy conditions for Pareto optimality and free trade again need not be best policy. But now the
departure from Pareto optimality involving marginal supply to the market is absent, and the allocation
issue is between SOEs and private ﬁrms within manafactoring, with the SOEs too large relative to Pareto
optimality.
3.2 Worker Control Models
We next consider two versions of models incorporating worker control rather than managerial control
of SOEs. In the basic worker control model SOE behaviour reﬂects joint decision making on output by the
members of each enterprise. We assume both the membership of the enterprise and the enterprise wage
rate are ﬁxed and that enterprise members must jointly meet the enterprise budget constraint. If they
fail to cover costs by selling output, the enterprise is bankrupt and workers lose their jobs. Enterprise
10members thus collectively satisﬁce and meet the enterprise budget constraint by setting an eﬀort level
which yields the required output. They then either shirk or expend additional eﬀort on second jobs. In
the simple version of this model we consider only a single state-owned enterprise in the manufacturing
sector and two sectors; agriculture with private competitive enterprises and manufacturing with only a
single SOE. As with the managerial control model, we then consider an extension with both SOEs and
private ﬁrms in manufacturing.
For this model domestic prices are again given from world prices by (1). In the agricultural sector
the production function is as described in the simple managerial control model (see (2) and (3)). In
the simple version of the model with only SOEs in manufacturing, the labour input in the agriculture
sector is assumed ﬁxed, so output is always same. In SOEs, the labour input available in terms of the
number of manufacturing employees is also ﬁxed, but their eﬀort level is endogenous and hence output
is endogenous.In the more complex model with mobile labour in the private sector which spend both
manufacturing and agriculture, labour used in agriculture may vary.
For the manufacturing SOE sector we write the production function as
YM = φM[λLM]αM (22)
where λ denotes the endogenously determined level of eﬀort and LM is the membership size of the
enterprise. λ is eﬀectively determined by the enterprise budget constraint since workers supply eﬀort
which satisﬁes the enterprise budget constraint. These activities are modelled simply as resulting in
leisure consumption for SOE members and are represented by the term (1−λ)LM. This budget constraint
for the SOE in the manufacturing sector can be written as
PMYM = WMLM + RM (23)
where RM is again the required surplus of the enterprise transferred to the state.
On the demand side of the model, domestic consumption of agricultural and manufacturing product
again reﬂect utility maximizing behaviour, but the model involves separately specifying the demand side
behaviour of workers employed in the agricultural sector and in the SOE in manufacturing.
Income of workers employed in agricultural and manufacturing workers are














where γA and γM refer to the shares of the tariﬀ revenue distributed by government to workers in
agricultural and manufacturing sectors with γA + γM = 1. ZA and ZM are again the net trades in each
product (positive indicates imports and negative exports).
Preferences for workers in the agricultural sector are deﬁned only over agricultural and manufacturing
goods, and leisure does not appear. We use this simplifying treatment since a departure from Pareto
optimality involving leisure consumption would only occur in the manufacturing sector we were to specify





AM , θAA + θAM = 1 (26)
The household budget constraint is
PAXAA + PMXAM = IA. (27)








For the consumers receiving income from working in the manufacturing sector SOE, their utility is
now deﬁned over 3 goods, consumption of agricultural and manufacturing goods and leisure, given by





MM [(1 − λ)LM]
θ
0
MM , θMA + θMM + θ0
MM = 1 (29)
The household budget constraint is
PAXMA + PMXMM = IM. (30)












The net trades are
ZA = XAA + XMA − YA and ZM = XAM + XMM − YM. (32)
With this formulation, the marginal utility of leisure will not necessarily equal the marginal value of
additional eﬀort in production, since the requirement is that the enterprise members meet their budget
constraint or face loss of their jobs. This means that satisﬁcing bahaviour (in the sense of Simon) occurs










and this provides is an additional departure from Pareto Optimality besides those conventionally asso-
ciated with trade interventions (such as a tariﬀ at the border) in a competitive model and will imply
consumption of leisure inconsistent with Pareto optimality. Production will also be aﬀected by a tariﬀ
and a changed value of λ. The additional distortion of leisure consumption relative to Pareto optimality
implies that free trade again need not be the best policy since in free trade (33) will apply. A trade in-
tervention will aﬀect consumption and production, but may also improve matters in terms of the leisure
distortion.
A equilibrium for this model is characterized by an equilibrium value of λ, and the wage rate. Given
λ, the output of the SOE, and both household budget constraints are then determined. Agricultural
12output is determined by domestic prices and the agricultural production function given LA. Consumption
by each household type can be determined and international trade is given by the diﬀerence between
production and consumption of each good. Trade balance follows directly from the budget constraint.
λ can be changed by trade policy interventions since domestic prices will change. If reduction in a
tariﬀ lowers domestic prices and raises output of manufacturing from the budget constraint (23),this is
opposite to the behaviour in a traditional competitive model in which a lowered tariﬀ reduces output
in the protected sector. Because of the satisﬁcing behaviour of enterprise members in terms of eﬀort
supply, the marginal utility of leisure will not necessarily equal the marginal value of extra eﬀort in
manufacturing production. The marginal valuation of leisure by workers in manufacturing on the one
hand and the additional potential output from increased eﬀort on the other will not be the same. This
is a departure from Pareto optimality on the consumption and product sides which exists along with
conventional distortions of trade. Free trade again need no longer be best policy because of the presence
of the additional leisure distortion.
In a more complex form of the worker control model, we can again consider two sectors, agriculture
but with both private competitive enterprises and private ﬁrms in manufacturing. Domestic prices are
again given from world prices by (12). The agricultural sector is the same.
For the manufacturing SOE, the production function is again
YS = φS[λLS]αS (34)
where λ denotes the endogenously determined level of eﬀort, and LS is the membership of enterprises.
Labour is paid its average value product and its share of any required surplus and capital is unpriced,
hence (14) holds.




and labour is paid its marginal product, i.e. the wage rate is given by (15).
Income of workers employed in agricultural and manufacturing workers are






























where γA, γS and γP refer to the shares of the tariﬀ revenue distributed by government to workers in
agricultural and manufacturing sectors with γA +γS +γP = 1. ZA, ZS and ZP are again the net trades
in each product (positive indicates imports and negative exports).
Preferences for workers in the agricultural sector are deﬁned only over agricultural and manufacturing
goods, and leisure does not appear. We use this simplifying treatment since a departure from Pareto
optimality involving leisure consumption would only occur in the manufacturing sector we were to specify







AP , θAA + θAS + θAP = 1 (39)
The household budget constraint is
PAXAA + PSXAS + PPXAP = IA. (40)











For the consumers receiving income from working in the manufacturing SOEs sector, their utility is
now deﬁned over 3 goods, consumption of agricultural and manufacturing goods and leisure, given by










SP , θSA + θSS + θ0
SS + θSP = 1 (42)
The household budget constraint is
PAXSA + PSXSS + PPXSP = IS. (43)
Consumption of the 3 agricultural and manufacturing goods by manufacturing workers is
XSA =
θSA















For the consumers receiving income from working in the manufacturing private ﬁrms sector, their







PP , θPA + θPS + θPP = 1 (45)
The household budget constraint is
PAXPA + PSXPS + PPXPP = IP. (46)











The net trades are
ZA = XAA + XMA − YA and ZM = XAM + XMM − YM. (48)
We can extend our treatment of the demand side of the economy by specifying preferences for workers
in both private ﬁrms and in the agricultural sector deﬁned only manufacturing and agricultural goods.
The demand side structure is thus similar to that of the simple model.
14The extended model departs from the simple model in having an endogenously determined wage
WA = WP such that labour markets in the private manufacturing and agricaulture sector in combination
clear, i.e.
LA + LP = L − LS (49)
where L − LS is the non SOE labour endowment of the economy.
A equilibrium is again given by a value of λ and equilibrium embodies maximization of utility subject
to household budget constraints with implied trade balance. The departure from Pareto optimality
remains that for workers in each SOE the marginal value of additional eﬀort in production diﬀers
the marginal value of extra leisure. The added feature of the more complex model is that marginal
supply of manufacturing output to the market will come from competitive ﬁrms and so departures from
Pareto optimality now occur with intra marginal SOE production and the associated distortion of leisure
consumption by workers in the SOE.
154 Numerical Analysis of SOE Responses to Trade Liberaliza-
tion in China
We have used the two formulations set out above to conduct numerical analyses which explore
possible economy wide responses to trade liberalization in China in observationally equivalent models
and contrast the results to those generated by comparable simple competitive structures. We calibrate
both model forms to a 2003 benchmark equilibrium data set capturing the presence of Chinese SOEs,
and use similar data in calibrating a competitive model for comparison purposes.
We draw on data from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2004) (from the China
Statistical Yearbook) for our calibrations. In the simple versions of both models, we treat the entire
managerial sector as a simple SOE. For the more complex model forms we group the manufacturing
sector in China across sectors of registration as reported in the China Statistical Yearbook and allo-
cate each to the two manufacturing sub sectors appearing in the model of SOEs and private ﬁrms.
Sectors of registration according to the statistical yearbook are as Manufacturing 1 = State-Owned
Industry, Manufacturing 2 = Collective-Owned Industry, Manufacturing 3 = Co-operative Enterprises,
Manufacturing 4 = Joint Ownership Enterprises, Manufacturing 5 = Limited Liability Co-operations,
Manufacturing 6 = Share Holding Enterprises, Manufacturing 7 = Private Enterprises, Manufacturing 8
= Other Enterprises, Manufacturing 9 = Enterprises with Funds from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan,
and Manufacturing 10 = Foreign Funded Enterprises. We treat the ﬁrst 5 as the SOE subsector, and
the latter 5 as the competitive subsector in manufacturing.
From the NBS data (Table 1) the 2003 gross output of the agriculture sector (farming, forestry,
animal husbandry and ﬁshery), PAYA, is 2969.180 billion RMB, and the value of labour input, WALA,
is 2614.101 billion RMB. The value of net trade (imports) in agriculture, ZA, is 3143.310 billion RMB.
The gross industrial output, PMYM, is 14227.122 billion RMB, and the value of labour input, WMLM, is
7297.69072 billion RMB. The value of net trade (exports) in manufacturing, ZM, is - 5252.79722 billion
RMB.
We deﬁne physical units for agricultural and manufacturing products to be related to these value
observations following the Harberger and Shoven and Whalley units convention that in the initial bench-
mark equilibrium data world prices, PA = PM = 1 and wage rates WA = WM = 1. There is no infor-
mation that we can use from base data to yield λ through calibration, and so we assume λ = 0.75 in
manufacturing in the base data and then perform sensitivity analysis around this value.
We use literature sources for both import tariﬀs and export subsidy rates for China’s agricultural
and manufacturing trade. The export subsidy for manufacturing reﬂects tax preferences for exports
given to foreign owned enterprises. The average tariﬀ rate on imports (agricultural good) is rA = 16.8%
(from Yu (2004) and BBCE (2004)), and the average export subsidy (subsidy rate on the manufacturing
good) is rM = −15.0% (from CHINANEWS (2003 and 2004)). These two compound in their eﬀects on
relative domestic prices relative to world prices. 3
3From these literatures sources, the average import tariﬀ rate on agricultural goods is 16.8 %, and the average export
16These data sources thus yield a benchmark data set that we are able to use in calibrating our 2
models in both their simple and more complex forms. The resulting model parameter values are set
out in Tables 2 and 3. In calibration, for the managerial control model ﬁrst order conditions imply no
value directly for the exponent in the production function. For the worker control model, calibration
is unable to use ﬁrst order conditions to yield share parameters on leisure in preferences for workers
in manufacturing enterprises. These we set equal to 0.25 and then also perform sensitivity analysis
around this setting. For the simple model variants we group the 5 SOE sectors and 5 private ﬁrms into
2 composite sectors. For the more complex model variants, we use 5 separate sector SOEs and 5 private
competitive sectors.
subsidy rate on agricultural goods is 8.5 %. The average import tariﬀ rate on manufacturing goods is 10.3 %, and the












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































19We have performed numerical simulation analyses for various forms of trade liberalization in China
using both SOE model formulations set out above, and also using their simple and more complex
forms. Using the model parameterizations generated by calibration we can then parametrically vary
the import tariﬀ and export subsidy rates and assess the economy wide behavioural response. This
allows us to assess the welfare implications of alternative trade policy changes in China capturing SOE
behavioural response using the two models formulations. We can also compare the results we generate
to a comparable competitive case by also calibrating a simple competitive model with decreasing returns
to scale production and sector speciﬁc rents using the same data sets for each SOE model. In each
experiment we perform we ﬁrst calibrate the relevant model to the 2003 benchmark data set out in
Table 1, and then vary both import tariﬀ and export subsidy rates and compute the relevant new
equilibria. We make welfare comparisons across equilibria using Hicksian equivalent variations expressed
as a % of GDP.
Table 4 reports the welfare impacts of moving to free trade in ﬁve diﬀerent model formulations all
calibrated to the same base case data. These are the simple and more complex managerial control
models, the simple and more complex worker control models described above, and a simple competitive
model. The diﬀerences in model results are striking. Moving to free trade in a simple competitive model
implies a welfare gains of 3.4 % of income, but in a simple managerial control model a welfare loss of
22.7 % and a sharply smaller welfare loss of 4.1 % in the complex managerial control model. The simple
and complex worker control model implies a welfare loss of 9 % and the more complex worker control
mald a welfare gain, but this is larger than in the competitive model. These results thus suggest that the
analytical formulation used to represent SOE behaviour when analyzing responses to trade liberalization
in China can make a large diﬀerence.
The 22.7% loss when moving to free trade in the simple managerial control model is especially
striking. This is a reﬂection of a number of features. First a loss occurs when moving to free trade
since with average product pricing of labour the marginal product of labour in manufacturing is below
the wage. Relative to Pareto optimality the SOE is too large, trade interventions correct for this
departure from Pareto optimality and removing them thus implies a welfare loss. Secondly, in the data
we use manufacturing accounts for nearly 80% of activity in the economy. We ignore services in our
benchmark data, and our data are consistent with the widely used ﬁgure that 60% of China’s GDP is
in manufacturing. Thirdly, the size of the loss moving to free trade depends critically on both the size
of the gap between average and marginal product, and their slopes. This gap is large in the base case,
and the slope of both marginal and average product functions shallow.
The 4.1% loss in the worker control case when moving to free trade reﬂects a smaller size for the
SOE sector relative to the whole of manufacturing, and the feature that marginal source of supply now
comes from competitive ﬁrms and it is the intra marginal SOE production that is now provided by an
enterprise that is too large.
Table 5 reports on sensitivity analyses in the simple and complex SOE models varying αM (the pro-
duction function exponent) around the control case value of 0.75. these variations make little diﬀerence
20to results.
Table 6 reports results by model type involving the separate elimination of import tariﬀs (on agricul-
ture) and export subsidies (on manufacturing). Removing each produces results that are smaller than
movements to free trade, but the signs are the same as these two as elements compound with each other
in their trade eﬀects. As in Table 4, there are large diﬀerences in results across models.
21Table 4. Impacts of Trade Liberalization in Managerial Control SOE,
Worker Control SOE, and Competitive Models
Hicksian Equivalent Variations of Welfare Change
Relative to Base Case as % of Base Case Income
in Moving to Free Trade
Simple Managerial Control SOE Model - 22.7266 %
Complex Managerial Control SOE Model - 4.1381 %
Simple Worker Control SOE Model - 9.2977 %
Complex Worker Control SOE Model 12.5506 %
Competitive Model 3.4560 %
Table 5. Sensitivity Analyses of Trade Liberalization Impacts
in Managerial and Worker Control SOE Models
Hicksian Eqivalent Varations of Welfare Change Relative to Base Case
as % of Base Case Income in Moving to Free Trade
Simple Managerial Complex Managerial Simple Worker Complex Worker
Control SOE Model Control SOE Model Control SOE Model Control SOE Model
α = 0.70 - 22.8080 % - 4.1850 % - 8.8539 % 12.7262 %
α = 0.75 - 22.7266 % - 4.1381 % - 9.2977 % 12.5506 %
α = 0.80 - 22.6420 % - 4.0918 % - 9.6983 % 12.3919 %
22Table 6. Impacts of Separate Trade Policy Instrument Removal
in Managerial Control SOE, Worker Control SOE, and Competitive Models
(Hicksian EVs as % of Base Case Income When Moving to Free Trade)
6.1. Elimination of Import Tariﬀ on Agricultural Imports
Hicksian Eqivalent Varations of Welfare Change
Relative to Base Case as % of Base Case Income
in Moving to Free Trade
Simple Managerial Control SOE Model - 14.0029 %
Complex Managerial Control SOE Model - 6.5716 %
Simple Worker Control SOE Model - 8.4655 %
Complex Worker Control SOE Model 6.5037 %
Competitive Model - 4.2198 %
6.2. Elimination of Export Subsidy on Manufacturing Exports
Hicksian Eqivalent Varations of Welfare Change
Relative to Base Case as % of Base Case Income
in Moving to Free Trade
Simple Managerial Control SOE Model - 19.5777 %
Complex Managerial Control SOE Model - 7.4557 %
Simple Worker Control SOE Model - 0.7591 %
Complex Worker Control SOE Model 5.0255 %
Competitive Model - 1.9449 %
23Table 7 reports results of changes in trade policies which go beyond free trade, either by having a
reduction in rather than a removal of import tariﬀs and export subsidies, or in having greater than 100
% reductions. In the competitive model, a 100 % reduction in tariﬀs and export subsidies maximizes
the welfare gain, implying that in this model free trade is the best policy. In the simple and more
complex managerial control models welfare losses increase continuously and beyond a 100 % reduction.
This suggests that in these model variants, increases in the level of trade protection rather than moves
towards free trade are welfare preferred. In the worker control models, free trade is again best policy.
Table 8 reports optimal policy interventions in the simple and more complex managerial control SOE
models for alternative value of αM, and also for the worker control model. As noted above, for the
worker control model free trade is the best policy, whereas in the managerial control models increases in
existing levels of protection as in the base case data are welfare preferred.
24Table 7. Impacts of Trade Policy Change Beyond Free Trade in Model Types
(Hicksian EVs as % of Base Case Income for Alternative % Joint Reductions)
(in Both Import Tariﬀs on Agricultural Imports and Export Subsidies on manufacturing Exports)
% Joint Reduction Simple Complex Simple Complex
in Managerial Managerial Worker Worker Competitive
both Import Tariﬀs Control Control Control Control Model
and Export Subsidies SOE Model SOE Model SOE Model SOE Model
0 0.0000 % 0.0000 % 0.0000 % 0.0000 % 0.0000 %
10 - 5.9595 % - 0.7184 % - 0.5743 % 1.1549 % 0.7226 %
20 - 9.2311 % - 1.2472 % - 1.2698 % 2.3279 % 1.3549 %
30 - 11.7650 % - 1.6720 % - 2.0648 % 3.5226 % 1.8969 %
40 - 13.8877 % - 2.0391 % - 2.9422 % 4.7413 % 2.3500 %
50 - 15.7363 % - 2.3774 % - 3.8878 % 5.9849 % 2.7171 %
60 - 17.3854 % - 2.7063 % - 4.8902 % 7.2533 % 3.0025 %
70 - 18.8815 % - 3.0390 % - 5.9398 % 8.5456 % 3.2120 %
80 - 20.2562 % - 3.3849 % - 7.0285 % 9.8604 % 3.3525 %
90 - 21.5322 % - 3.7500 % - 8.1498 % 11.1960 % 3.4313 %
100 - 22.7266 % - 4.1381 % - 9.2977 % 12.5506 % 3.4560 %
110 - 23.8526 % - 4.5505 % - 10.4675 % 13.9225 % 3.4336 %
120 - 24.9207 % - 4.9871 % - 11.6549 % 15.3106 % 3.3705 %
130 - 25.9396 % - 5.4464 % - 12.8563 % 16.7146 % 3.2720 %
140 - 26.9162 % - 5.9256 % - 14.0686 % 18.1347 % 3.1422 %
150 - 27.8566 % - 6.4218 % - 15.2889 % 19.5722 % 2.9842 %
160 - 28.7659 % - 6.9317 % - 16.5148 % 21.0288 % 2.8000 %
170 - 29.6483 % - 7.4523 % - 17.7442 % 22.5072 % 2.5908 %
180 - 30.5078 % - 7.9816 % - 18.9751 % 24.0103 % 2.3572 %
190 - 31.3476 % - 8.5178 % - 20.2058 % 25.5414 % 2.0990 %
200 - 32.1707 % - 9.0603 % - 21.4346 % 27.1043 % 1.8159 %
25Table 8. Optimal Trade Policies in Managerial Control and Worker Control SOE Models
(Hicksian EVs as % of Base Case Income for Alternative % Joint Reductions)
(% reduction in Import Tariﬀs and Export Subsidies)
8.1. Simple Managerial Control SOE Model
Optimal Joint Reductions Optimal Reduction Optimal Reduction
in Import Tariﬀs in in
and Export Subsidies Import Tariﬀs Export Subsidies
αM = 0.70 - 0.0795 % - 0.0998 % - 0.0670 %
αM = 0.75 - 0.7099 % - 2.3541 % - 1.0170 %
αM = 0.80 - 3.0408 % - 6.6764 % - 2.9350 %
8.2. Complex Managerial Control SOE Model
Optimal Joint Reductions Optimal Reduction Optimal Reduction
in Import Tariﬀs in in
and Export Subsidies Import Tariﬀs Export Subsidies
αM = 0.70 - 10.9169 % - 38.1336 % - 15.2859 %
αM = 0.75 - 19.6042 % - 67.1161 % - 27.6610 %
αM = 0.80 - 30.2607 % -102.3328 % - 41.3000 %
8.3. Simple Worker Control SOE Model
Optimal Joint Reductions Optimal Reduction Optimal Reduction
in Import Tariﬀs in in
and Export Subsidies Import Tariﬀs Export Subsidies
αM = 0.70 - 18.9400 % 39.4000 %
αM = 0.75 - 22.5500 % 32.1300 %
αM = 0.80 - 32.2000 % 24.8300 %
265 Conclusions
In this paper we present analytical formulations of SOE behavioural response to trade policy change
which we apply to the Chinese case. Our analyses are motivated both by the signiﬁcance of communally
controlled enterprise structures in economies such as China, and the seeming lack of analytical work
in existing literature capturing their behavioural response. At the save time we note that OECD style
competitive structures are now widely used in policy evaluation numerical simulation work on China.
We present two alternative formulations of SOE behavioural response to policy change. In the ﬁrst of
these, management controls enterprise behaviour with political appointees whose losses are re-capitalized
through the banking system and who are assumed to maximize enterprise size so as to yield the largest
potential personal networking beneﬁts to management. In this case labour is paid its average rather
than its marginal product and free trade is not best policy. In the second, workers collectively control
enterprise behaviour and meet the enterprise budget constraint given employment and wage rates, and
otherwise satisﬁce using surplus labour for moonlighting or second jobs. Again free trade is not best
policy.
Model results using 2003 data indicate welfare losses rather than welfare gains from trade liberal-
ization and eﬀects that are potentially very large. We compare model results to those from comparable
competitive structures calibrated to the same data set, and results show both diﬀerences of sign and
large quantitative variants. We conclude that explicit analytical representations of SOE behavioural
response is needed when assessing policy change such as trade liberalization in China.
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